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Abstract: Global food demand is estimated from population projections of the United 
Nations and food supply is projected from Food and Agriculture Organization yield data 
to quantify the global food supply-demand balance for 2025 and 2050. The eight food 
categories examined account for 95 percent of global food consumption.  
Results indicate that the historic era of secularly falling real food prices is over. 
The real price of corn, for example, is not expected to fall over the next four decades at 
the  annual  rate  of  1.3  percent  that  it  fell  annually  from  1960  to  2006.  The  analysis 
foresees future real food prices fluctuating around a flat or rising trend. Slowed national 
economic growth from flat or rising real food prices may be little more than an irritant for 
consumers in  affluent  countries,  but  will entail  severe hardship for  consumers in  the 
many countries currently troubled by poverty and hunger.  
Opportunities  exist  to  expand  food  output  by  adding  cropland  in  Brazil  and 
irrigation in Africa, for example, but in the long term such developments will be offset by 
cropland  removed  from  production  by  urban  and  industrial  development,  soil 
degradation, and the like. Although cropland can be expanded through higher real farm 
and  food  prices,  higher  yields  rather  than  added  cropland  offer  the  most  attractive 
opportunities for farm output expansion at low cost to consumers and the environment.   
The  slowing  rate  of  increase  in  crop  and  livestock  yields  corresponds  with  a 
slowing rate of increase in public and in private agricultural research and development 
spending.  The  world  will  not  have  the  luxury  of  curtailing  spending  on  agricultural 
technology and rejecting promising technologies such as genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) if is to keep real food costs from rising. Productive new cropland, irrigation, 
genetically  modified  varieties,  and  other  technologies  will  be  hard  pressed  indeed  to 
match the massive historic gains from hybrid varieties, irrigation, synthetic fertilizers, 
and  mechanization.  On  the  demand  side,  subsidies  to  expand  demand  for  farming 
resources such as biofuels will need revisiting if rising food costs are to be contained.  
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  Historically, rising living standards have been inseparable from the declining real 
price of food. Falling global food prices mean that fewer resources are needed to supply 
food, thereby freeing resources to supply education, science, and technology that further 
raise  living  standards  and  quality  of  life.  Fewer  people  supplying  food  leaves  more 
people to supply entertainment, shelter, disease control, environmental protection, and 
other concomitants of a better life. 
  The Malthusian specter—secularly rising food costs and associated falling living 
standards and (in poor countries) rising poverty, disease, and hunger—has once again 
been  raised  by  rising  real  farm  and  food  prices  in  recent  years.  The  International 
Monetary Fund index of food commodity prices  increased 130 percent from  January 
2002 to July 2008 (Trostle 2008, p. 3). The rise was due to higher energy prices, biofuel 
production,  rapid  international  economic  growth,  drought  in  selected  countries, 
depreciation of the dollar, and trade restrictions by some food exporting countries. These 
items are important in the short run, but at issue in this analysis is the influence on real 
food prices of secular (long-term) changes in the global food supply-demand balance.   
  Whether real food prices will decline in the 21
st century is now an open question. 
Improved transportation, communication, and more open markets have made food an 
international market. The international food supply-demand balance determines real food 
prices. Real food prices will increase in the future if global growth in demand for farm 
output outpaces global growth in supply. On the demand side, agricultural output has 
never been just for food, but it is being called upon as never before to provide biofuels 
and environmental amenities as well. Or real food prices could rise not just from growing 
demand  but  also  from  slowing  supply:  Environmental  degradation  and  neglect  of 
investment in technology and infrastructure could retard agricultural productivity gains 
that traditionally have driven agricultural supply. 
The objective of this study is to examine whether global real farm and food prices 
are likely to continue to fall in the future as they have in past decades. If portents are for 
agricultural supply to outpace demand and hence for real food prices to continue their 
secular decline, then public efforts to vigorously stimulate biofuel production may be 
appropriate. On the other hand if under current policies the likely outlook is for rising real 
food prices, policymakers may wish to  forego biofuel subsidies and instead redouble 
incentives  to  increase  agricultural  productivity  through  education,  research,  and 
development. 
Either one of two approaches can be used to quantify the long-term global food 
supply-demand  balance.  One  approach  is  estimation  of  detailed  supply  and  demand 
relationships for individual commodities, countries, and policies. Such structural analysis 
though  useful  for  some  purposes  is  bedeviled  with  errors  in  quantifying  interactions 
among components, hence errors accumulate in long-term projections.  The second or 
predictive approach, that is used in this study, projects future food and farm supply and 
demand from past trends in food aggregates. The central premise is conditional: If past 
trends continue, these are the most likely outcomes for 2025 and 2050.    2 
Global demand trends are measured herein by population and income projections 
with adjustments for rising demand for biofuels and selected other factors. However, the 
principal focus of this study is on farm and food supply trends, especially on crop and (to 
a lesser extent) livestock yields. The focus is on yields for several reasons. The principal 
mover of agricultural output has been yields; real farm prices have fallen over time and 
discouraged use of more land, labor, and conventional capital. Agriculture will be able to 
supply output at lower real cost only by increasing productivity. Yields are a useful proxy 
for productivity (output per aggregate input), the latter, unfortunately, is not available for 
global crops and livestock.  
 
Global Agricultural Output Demand 
  Food demand projections depict the challenge facing world agriculture. If supply 
cannot move forward to keep pace with demand, the real price of food at the farm level 
will need to increase to discourage consumption and encourage production so that supply 
and demand are brought into balance. 
Global agricultural demand will grow in coming decades mainly from population 
gains.  Rising  income  also  will  add  to  the  demand  for  farm  output,  especially  in 
developing  countries  where  a  sizable  share  of  income  is  spent  on  food.  Biofuels, 
―farmaceuticals‖, and plastics are emerging sources of farm output demand.   
Annex  table  4,  recognizing  the  different  response  of  food  and  fiber  demand 
among countries by income level, indicates that the per capita food and fiber demand 
growth rate from income does not change very much over time. The quite stable 0.27 
percent gain per capita per year over time from rising income is explained as shown in 
annex table 4 by the falling income elasticity of food demand under rising global incomes 
offset by the rising share of global population in developing countries with relatively high 
(though falling) income elasticities of food demand. 
 
Biofuels 
  Biofuel demand depends on economic profitability and on government subsidies 
and mandates for biofuel use. The federal Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
as amended in March of 2008 mandates 9 billion gallons of vehicle ethanol fuel in 2008, 
13.2 billion gallons in 2012, and 15 billion gallons in 2015.
1 The market plus current 
federal subsidies and tariffs on ethanol seem consistent with meeting the mandates if the 
price of oil is approximately $80 per barrel and the corn price is $3.77 per bushel (see 
Roberts 2008; Babcock 2008). Ethanol as an oxygenate is readily blended with gasoline 
in so-called E10, a mix with 10 percent ethanol. Opportunities for ethanol are less 
attractive  beyond  that  blending  opportunity.  The  Environmental  Protection  Agency 
allowed up to a ten percent blend of ethanol in the 140 billion gallons of gasoline 
consumed in the U.S. in 2008, thus potentially utilizing 14 billion gallons of ethanol. 
However,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture’s  10-year  projections  look  to  slowing 
growth in U.S. ethanol production (Trostle 2008, p. 9).   
Kruse et al. (May 2007, p. 16) estimate that markets plus existing U.S. tax and 
tariff provisions would result in 12.37 billion gallons annually of U.S. ethanol production 
                                                 
1 The renewable vehicle fuel mandate calls for 36 billion gallons of ethanol for 2022, half to come from 
cellulosic ethanol. Technology to efficiently produce the latter is unavailable and may not be forthcoming 
by 2022, hence the impact of the mandate on corn ethanol use is elusive.    3 
from 2011 to 2016, near the mandated level. However, in the absence of tax and tariff 
inducements and mandates, ethanol production was estimated to average only 8.61 billion 
gallons annually for the 2011-2016 period. U.S. biodiesel production in the same period 
was estimated to average 0.51 billion gallons annually with government incentives and 
only 0.23 billion gallons without incentives. 
  The  economic  impact  of  biofuel  production  in  the  intermediate  to  long  run 
considered  in  this  study  is  influenced  by  substitution  among  farm  resources  and 
commodities in a global context. The mandated 13.2 billion gallon ethanol target for 
2012, if achieved, adds $15 billion to U.S. farm receipts--assuming $3.77 per bushel corn 
and 20 percent feed recovery per bushel. Assuming another $5 billion added by biodiesel 
from soybeans, farming receipts are raised by an estimated 6.6 percent. Considering the 
addition to receipts as the addition to farm output, and with a price elasticity of excess 
demand of -0.3 in the intermediate run (3-5 years) and –1.0 in the long run  (many years), 
U.S. farm prices are raised 22 percent in 3-5 years and 6.6 percent in many years by 
biofuel production. With farm ingredients only 24 percent of retail food cost, the forgoing 
biofuel numbers translate into a 5 percent increase in food prices in the intermediate run 
and 1.6 percent in the long run.  
  Given that other nations (except Brazil) on average are likely to rely less than the 
U.S.  on  biofuels,  the  global  impact  of  expected  levels  of  biofuel  production  may  be 
relatively less than indicated above. Thus the introduction of biofuels does not seem to 
unduly upset the global food supply-demand balance. To be sure, the 21 million barrel 
per day global gasoline industry and the equally massive global diesel industry constitute 
a highly elastic and almost inexhaustible demand for biofuels at high oil prices. Ethanol 
consumed 23 percent of U.S. corn production in 2008, but that ethanol accounted for only 
3 percent of U.S. gasoline consumption. Brazil has shown that ethanol can substitute for 
gasoline over a considerable range of utilization, hence U.S. demand for ethanol is great 
indeed at oil priced above $80 per barrel. On the other hand, the limited global supply of 
land,  water,  and  other  farm  resources  implies  strong  market  restraints  on  biofuel 
production.  Limited  resources  to  supply  crops  and  livestock  coupled  with  competing 
demands for food and fiber means that agriculture will supply only a minor share of 
vehicle fuels at home and abroad in the future. Among countries, Brazil is one exception 
to  that  conclusion.  A  recent  review  (Searchinger  2008,  p.1)  of  ten  biofuel  studies 
concluded ―Mandates and subsidies to produce biofuels are significantly more expensive 
methods than other methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions…‖ In the unlikely 
event that policymakers accept that conclusion and withdraw subsidies, the following 
projections of biofuel use could be overoptimistic. 
  Assuming production trends follow the federal biofuel mandate, that each bushel 
of corn for ethanol retains 20 percent of its feeding value for livestock, and that each 
bushel of corn produces 2.7 gallons of ethanol, then ethanol demand adds an estimated 
0.41 percentage points annually to the growth  in American agricultural receipts from 
2008 to 2012 and only 0.14 percentage points annually to the growth of farm receipts 
from 2012 to 2015. The European Union also  is mandating future biofuel use; other 
countries  may  join  the  effort.  In  subsequent  analysis,  nonfood  demands  for  biofuels, 
nutriceuticals, farmaceuticals, and the like are assumed to add 0.10 percentage points 
annually to global farm output demand. 
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Demand projections 
  Table 1 shows past and projected annual growth rates in farm output demand 
from 1961 to 2050 from population only and from all sources based on assumptions 
discussed above. The initial year, 1961, was chosen because several data series used in 
this study began with that year. 
   
Table 1. Rate of increase and global total demand for farm output due to population only 
and from all sources in selected years from 1961 to 2050  
 
Item        Year     
    Actual                     Projected 
  1961  1975  2000  Variant  2025  2050 
Annual increase in year,%             
   Population only  1.89  1.85  1.31  Low  0.48  -0.17 
        Medium  0.82  0.36 
        High  1.13  0.88 
             
   Total agri. demand  --  --  --  Low  0.83  0.18 
        Medium  1.17  0.71 
        High  1.48  1.23 
             
Agri. output, accumulated demand   Year 2000=100         
   Population only  50  67  100  Low  124  127 
        Medium  131  150 
        High  138  176 
             
   Total agri. demand  --  --  100  Low  135  152 
        Medium  143  179 
        High  151  209 
 
Source: Population numbers from United Nations Population Division (October 1, 2008, p. 1). After year 
2000, projected world demand growth for farm output per capita is calculated as the average compound rate 
of growth in population plus 0.25 percent annually due to income growth (see annex table 4) and 0.10 
percent annually due to sources other than food and fiber (see text). 
 
  Population numbers from the United Nations are projections—the likely world 
population at future points in time under specified assumptions. The numbers are not 
predictions  of  the  most  likely  population  in  any  particular  year.  Nonetheless,  many 
demographers view the assumptions underlying the ―medium‖ and ―low‖ projections as 
most realistic and thus provide the most realistic population ―predictions‖ (see Tweeten 
2007, ch. 9). The medium population variant calls for global population to increase 0.82 
percent  in  2025 and 0.36 percent  in  2050. World  population  growth  rates have been 
slowing  for  some  years  and  several  experts  believe  that  global  population  will  have 
already  begun  to  fall  by  mid-century  as  depicted  by  the  negative  growth  rate  –0.17 
percent per year under the low population growth variant for 2050 in table 1. 
  If demand for farm output were proportional solely to population and the low 
population growth variant prevailed, demand for farm output would be only one-fourth   5 
greater in 2025 and 2050 than in 2000. A more realistic projection based on the medium 
population  variant  and  including  nonfood  demands  is  that  overall  demand  for  farm 
products will be 143 percent of year 2000 output in 2025 and 179 percent of 2000 output 
in 2050 (Table 1). Thus demand could nearly double in the first half of the 21
st century 
based on the medium UN population projection. The demand under the high population 
variant seems less likely. It will be necessary to return to table 1 numbers to ascertain the 
global agricultural supply-demand balance and resulting prices after examining supply 
projections in the following pages. 
 
Global Agricultural Output Supply 
Ideally, the outward shift of the supply curve would be measured by multi-factor 
productivity  growth,  i.e.,  output  per  unit  of  all  production  inputs.  Unfortunately, 
agricultural productivity has not been measured for recent years or for many countries 
and  commodities.  Figure  1  from  Alston  and Pardey  (2008)  shows  that  the  level  and 
variation in land productivity (yield) in the United States closely aligns with multi-factor 
productivity. U.S. labor productivity advanced markedly in recent decades, freeing farm 
workers to produce other goods and services prized by consumers. But land more than 
labor constrains farm output, hence productivity of land is of special interest. U.S. land 
productivity increased 1.77 percent annually while multi-factor productivity increased 
2.01 percent annually from 1950 to 1989 (see figure 1). Multi-factor productivity growth 
then slowed considerably, however, averaging only 1.14 percent annually from 1990 to 
2002. In this study, major crop and livestock yield trends for the U.S. and the world will 
be  examined  for  evidence  of  a  continuing  slowdown  in  productivity  growth.  The 
following paragraphs examine the potential impact of irrigation, global warming, and 
cropland area on agricultural output before observing historic yield trends.  
 
Irrigation 
  Yields in this study are from irrigated and rainfed agriculture and from developed 
and developing country agriculture. Irrigation contributes mightily to farm output. Some 
40 percent of agricultural production and fully 60 percent of the world’s grain are from 
irrigated land (Meinzen-Dick and Rosegrant 2001, p. 1). Irrigated agriculture currently 
accounts for only 18 percent of cultivated area in developing countries but for 40 percent 
of the value of agricultural output (World Bank 2007, p. 182). The following analysis 
recognizes yield gains on irrigated cropland from improved crop varieties and technology 
throughout  the  world.  Substantial  rainfed  land  in  rich  and  poor  countries  could  be 
irrigated but rising energy costs preclude doing so in the absence of rising real farm and 
food prices. As the water table level drops in aquifers such as the Ganges Plain in India or 
the Ogallala basin underlying the southern Great Plains in the U.S., pumping water for 
irrigation from ever-greater depths becomes uneconomic. Formerly irrigated farmland 
will remain in agriculture but yields with rainfed crops will be lower. A third of irrigation 
relies  on  water  behind  dams.  Lack  of  promising  additional  sites  coupled  with 
environmental  concerns  leaves  modest  scope  for  building  more  dams  for  irrigation. 
Extensive water use for crop irrigation and urban population has reduced water flow in 
the Colorado, Rio Grand, Ganges, and Nile rivers to little more than a trickle in some 
seasons. An increasing proportion of river flows now used for crop irrigation will be 
diverted to urban use in future decades.   6 
 









































































































      Source: Alston and Pardey (2008) 
 
Large areas  of China, South  Asia, and the Middle East  and North Africa  are 
extracting groundwater or river water for irrigation at unsustainable levels. Groundwater 
overdraft in excess of sustainable levels exceeds 25 percent in China and 56 percent in 
parts of northwest India. These irrigated areas currently are some of the world’s most 
productive (see World Bank 2007, p. 64).  
  On the other hand, opportunities to expand irrigation are promising on some of 
the  currently  most  unproductive  lands  in  the  world.  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  irrigated 
agriculture is projected to double by 2030 from the 2007 level. Only 4 percent of the 
cultivated area in that region was irrigated in 2007, and a mere 4 million hectares had 
been  added  in  the  past  40  years.  Lack  of  infrastructure  (roads,  bridges,  etc.)  and 
institutional support has been and will continue to be a stumbling block to expansion of 
irrigation in that region. Such considerations prompted the World Bank (2007, p. 64) to 
conclude  that  irrigated  area  in  developing  countries  is  likely  to  expand  by  only  0.2 
percent annually in the developing world by 2030. Additions will be less after 2030. 
―Yield improvements in existing irrigated areas, rather than further expansion, will be the 
main source of growth in irrigated agriculture‖ (World Bank 2007, p. 184).  
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Global Warming 
  Global warming is expected to have minimal overall impact on worldwide food 
and fiber output but impacts will differ widely by region. Yield level and variation may 
be more affected than crop area by global warming. Mainly due to lower yields, Cline 
(2007) projects agricultural output will fall 16 percent from global warming by 2020—
some  6  percent  in  developed  countries  and  20  percent  in  developing  countries.  The 
overall reduction could be reduced to 3 percent due to ―carbon fertilization‖ as higher 
carbon dioxide levels stimulate photosynthesis. Estimates from Rosenzweig and Perry 
(1994) and Mendelsohn and Neuman (1999) place the loss of cereal production from 
global warming at up to 7 percent in developing countries offset by gains of up to 14 
percent  in  developed  countries,  leaving  global  cereal  output  unchanged.  A  similar 
conclusion was reached more recently by Tubiello and Fischer (2007, pp. 1030-56) who 
conclude that between 1990 and 2080 global cereal output is expected to fall by only 0.6 
to 0.9 percent due to global warming, other things equal. They anticipate that global 
warming will increase cereal production by 2.7 to 9.0 percent in developed countries but 
decrease cereal production by 3.3 to 7.2 percent in developing countries by 2080. Thus, 
unfortunately, the most severe hardship is likely to occur in the poorest countries, with 
cereal production falling by 18.2 to 21.1 percent in South Asia and by 3.9 to 7.5 percent 
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Tubiello  and  Fischer  2007).    However,  exploiting  irrigation 
potential in Sub-Saharan Africa could offset losses from global warming on that region.  
 
Area response 
  The  global  area  in  the  six  major  crop  groups  in  this  study  remained  almost 
unchanged at 1.1 billion hectares from 1985 to 2006. However, due to rising demand 
from ethanol production and other factors such as rapid economic growth in China, the 
six-crop  harvested  area  surged  from  1,079  million  hectares  in  2002  to  1,155  million 
hectares  in  2007. The latter period  growth is  unsustainable. The following text  table 
shows  trend  area  growth  rates  predicted  by  linear  and  double-logarithm  equations 
estimated by ordinary least squares from annual data for years 1961 to 2007. A linear 
equation with six-crop area as a function of time depicts a trend growth rate of 0.46 
percent for 1961 but dropping to 0.33 percent for 2050. The double log function with the 
dependent variable, six-crop area, and time, expressed as the year less 1900, displayed 
better statistical properties than the linear-in-original-values equation as measured by the 
statistical significance of the time variable, the adjusted R-square, and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic.   
 
      Year     
Function  1961  1975  2000  2025  2050 
  Trend rate of increase in six-crop area, % in year: 
Linear  0.46  0.43  0.39  0.36  0.33 
Log-log  0.57  0.46  0.35  0.28  0.23 
   Source: Data from FAO 2008 
 
  The initial supply shift projections of this study assume no increase in crop area in 
2025 and 2050 over year 2000 area. The presumption of no increase in cropland without 
an increase in the real price of food may seem severe given the recent rise in global   8 
cropland area. The following numbers, though sparse, highlight the challenge of even 
maintaining crop area in the future. Myers (1997, pp. 8-10) estimated that worldwide 
annual  abandonment  of  agricultural  land  averages  10.75  million  hectares  due  to  soil 
erosion, 6.00 million hectares due to overgrazing, and another 2.00 million hectares due 
to  water  logging  and  salinization  through  irrigation.  The  sum  of  these  losses,  18.75 
million hectares per year, exceeds the 5 to 12 million hectares of agricultural land that the 
International  Food  Policy  Institute  (IFPRI  1999,  p.  20)  reports  is  lost  worldwide  to 
degradation each year. Most of that degradation is occurring in poor countries and has 
accelerated there in the past 50 years (IFPRI 1999, p. 2). 
World Resources Institute (WRI 1996, p. 59) reports loss of 476,000 hectares of 
agricultural land each year due to urban development including buildings, roads, parks, 
airports,  and  reservoirs.  Much  of  this  loss  of  agricultural  land  will  take  place  in 
developing countries already stretched to provide sufficient food. There, urban population 
is expected to double from the 1990 level to total 3.4 billion persons by year 2020 and 
account for virtually all the world’s population growth (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1999, p. 
5). Urbanization, however, accounts for only a small portion of the total annual estimated 
agricultural land loss averaging 5 to 19 million hectares. 
This annual loss can be compared to prospective additions to agricultural lands. 
The most promising prospects are in Brazil, although selected other regions especially in 
Russia  and  Africa  also  offer  promise—heroically  assuming  that  needed  massive 
investments  in  infrastructure,  including  roads  and  irrigation  along  with  security  and 
technology, can be provided. In 1990, Brazil’s national institute for agricultural research, 
EMBRAPA, estimated that 136 million hectares of the interior cerrado savannah were 
suited  for  large-scale  agriculture,  an  increase  from  the  region’s  47  million  hectares 
utilized in 1990 (Schepf et al. 2001, p. 12). The additional 89 million hectares are feasible 
with treatment of the soil for acidity, aluminum toxicity, and for deficiencies in nitrogen 
and phosphate. The region is especially well suited to soybeans, and accounted for much 
of the expansion in Brazil’s annual average soybean area harvested from 3.7 million 
hectares in 1970-74 to 12.4 million hectares in 1995-99.  
The conclusion, that the world will need another Brazilian cerrado every four to 
18 years to compensate for cropland losses from degradation and (to a much smaller 
extent)  urbanization,  is  sobering.  Though  crude,  the  estimate  supports  our  no-net-
cropland-change assumption (in the absence of an increase in food real prices) when 
projecting long term food supply. Those who consider reasonable the area trends shown 
in  the  text  table  above  can  add  0.2  to  0.3  percentage  points  to  the  aggregate  yield 
percentage increases  for 2025 and 2050 shown later to  express  the total  farm output 
supply response. It is recognized that cropland expansion carries environmental costs 




U.S. crop yields are examined first because it is a major agricultural producer, is 
at the vanguard of technological advance, and has extensive data. Later, worldwide crop 
and livestock yields are examined individually and combined to form aggregate supply 
trends for comparison with aggregate demand trends for global farm output. Yields for 
the four major U.S. farm crops shown in figures 2 to 5 display considerable variation 
                                                 
2 All yield data are from FAO (2008).   9 
from year to year but made sizable gains from 1961 to 2007. The figures show actual 
yields (+) along with a linear yield trend line. The statistical results in the annex indicate 
that curvilinear equations fit the data little better than the linear functions (straight lines) 
shown  in  figures  2  to  5.  Annual  yield  gains  averaged  1,154  hectograms  per  hectare 
(hg/ha)  (1.8  bushels  per  acre)  for  corn,  243  to  256  hg/ha  (0.4  bushels  per  acre)  for 
soybeans and wheat, and 198 hg/ha (18 pounds per acre) for cotton. Cotton yields show 
signs  of accelerating in  recent  years. The implications  of alternative interpretation  of 
trends are examined later. 
Figures 6 to 11 show actual yields and a linear trend line for the world’s major 
crop groups from 1961 to 2007. Except for oilcrops (soybeans, rapeseed, etc.), yields 
appear to be increasing along a straight line. Cereals such as corn, wheat, and rice are of 
special importance because they account for half of the world’s diet directly and for up to 
two-thirds if the contributions of cereals to livestock and poultry products are considered. 
Two additional features of figure 6 for world cereals  and figure 2 for U.S.  corn are 
notable. First, relative variation in yields is much less for world cereals than for U.S. 
corn. A world that can share cereal output through trade has access to a rather steady 
supply from year to year.  
 




                                                              Year (Current year less 1900) 
 
Figure 3. U.S. soybean yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/hectare) 
   10 
 
                                                                   Year (Current year less 1900) 
 
 
Figure 4. U.S. wheat yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/hectare) 
 
  






Figure 5. U.S. cotton yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/hectare) 
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Figure 6. World cereal yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 
 
     
                                                                 Year (Current year less 1900) 
 
 
Figure 7. World oilcrop yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 




                                        Year (Current year less 1900) 






Figure 8. World sugar crop yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 
 
 
                                                                              Year (Current year less 1900) 
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Figure 9. World vegetable and melon yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 
 






Figure 10. World root and tuber yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 
 
 
                                         Year (Current year less 1900) 
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Figure 11. World pulses yield, 1961-2007 (tons/hectare) 
 
       
                                         Year (Current year less 1900) 
 
The second observation is that, compared to U.S. corn, world cereal yield annual 
increments are of modest size on average. Corn yields in the U.S. (figure 2) increased on 
average 2.6 times the rate of world cereal yield in part because some cereals such as 
sorghum and millet tend to be produced in arid regions of the world offering minimal 
yield response to improved practices with available varieties.  
  Recent world sugar crop yields show signs of accelerating and world vegetable 
and melon yields show signs of falling in recent years. It is hazardous, however, to let an 
interpretation from 3-4 recent years take precedence over the 47-year trend. 
Historic world livestock yields are shown in figures 12 to 16 to complete the yield 
analysis of farm output. The concept of livestock yield is elusive because opportunities 
are much greater to expand livestock prod uction by increasing the number of animals 
than it is to expand crop production by adding area. Furthermore, data on livestock yields 
are less reliable than on crop yields. Nonetheless, livestock yields such as milk per cow 
or eggs per hen provide clues to  livestock productivity and the challenge of providing 
food efficiently in the future. 
World livestock yields, like crop yields shown earlier, are increasing. The pattern 
of increase varies. Pig meat yields appear to be increasing at a constant rate, cattl e meat 
and egg yields appear to be increasing at a decreasing rate, and chicken meat yields 
appear to be increasing at an increasing rate. The trend in milk yield per cow is erratic, 
perhaps due to data problems, so firm conclusions regarding trends are un warranted. 
Where more accurate data are available, evidence is clear that milk per cow has increased 
in recent decades, thereby increasing economic efficiency and reducing real milk and 
milk product prices. 
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Figure 12. World pig meat yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/pig) 
 
  






Figure 13. World cattle meat yield, 1961-2007   
(tons/head)
 
                                                   Year (Current year less 1900) 
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Figure 14. World chicken meat yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/chicken) 
 
 




Figure 15. World egg yield, 1961-2007 (kilograms per hen) 
 
 
                                                 Year (Current year less 1900) 
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Figure 16. World milk yield, 1961-2007 (hectograms/cow) 
 
 
                                                  Year (Current year less 1900) 
 
Future Food Supply-Demand Balances 
  The foregoing figures 2 to 16 do not facilitate comparison of yield growth among 
commodities or with respect to the rate of growth in demand for farm output. Table 2 for 
U.S. crops and tables 3 and 4 for world crop and livestock yields respectively (see also 
annex  equations)  facilitate  comparisons  in  judging  the  world  food  supply-demand 
balance. To place the table 2 numbers in perspective, it is well to recall from table 1 that 
demand for the world’s farm output is predicted to be increasing at a rate of 1.17 percent 
in 2025 and 0.71 percent in 2050 based on the UN medium population projection. Crop 
groups in tables 2 and 3 will need to increase at least by these rates if they are to maintain 
their share of overall demand growth from yield gains alone. 
On the whole, results from linear equations were judged to be most acceptable 
based on signs and significance of coefficients, adjusted R-square, and Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Results  from  one other  attractive specification were included in table 2 and 
subsequent tables for comparison purposes. None of the linear equations for four major 
U.S. crops individually or a weighted average in table 2 predicts a yield increase as high 
as 1.17 percent in 2025. And for 2050 only the U.S. corn yield gain of 0.81 percent 
exceeds the predicted world demand gain of 0.71 percent for that year. The nonlinear 
equations except for wheat are more optimistic than are linear equations predicting future 
yield  prospects.    Rates  of  increase  in  aggregate  yields  (weighted  by  individual  crop 
revenue from 2001 to 2003) by 2000 are only one-third to one-half the rate of increase in 
1961. Without the sizable drop in the growth rate of farm output demand due to slowing 
population growth as depicted in table 1, the world would be destined for sharply rising 
real food prices—if world yield patterns in tables 3 and 4 are similar for those for the 
U.S. shown in table 2.   18 
 
Table 2. Predicted annual increase in U.S. major crop yields in selected years 
 
Crop  Proportion 






Predicted percent increase in yield  
in year: 
        1961  1975  2000  2025  2050 
Corn  0.443  1.1 (Fig. 2)  Linear  2.87  2.05  1.35  1.01  0.81 
    1.2  Log-log   2.42  1.97  1.48  1.18  0.98 
                 
Soybeans  0.322  2.1 (Fig. 3)  Linear  1.66  1.35  1.01  0.80  0.67 
    2.2  Semi-log  1.20  1.20  1.20  1.20  1.20 
                 
Wheat  0.121  3.1 (Fig. 4)  Linear  1.38  1.16  0.90  0.73  0.62 
    3.2  Quadratic  2.50  1.44  0.48  -0.19  -0.97 
                 
Cotton  0.114  4.1 (Fig. 5)  Linear  1.57  1.29  0.98  0.78  0.66 
    4.2  Quadratic  -0.33  0.69  1.78  1.91  1.72 
  1.000      Weighted average 
      Highest  2.29  1.66  1.35  1.22  1.09 
      Linear  2.15  1.63  1.14  0.88  0.72 
      Lowest  1.59  1.48  1.09  0.77  0.53 
Source: See equations in annex. Yield data from FAO (2008); shares are weighted by revenue data for 
2001-2003 from USDA (2008).  
 
Global percentage yield gains  
Table 3 shows global crop yield growth for selected years for eight commodity 
groups and in aggregate predicted by equations in the annex. Yields of commodity groups 
are predicted by the linear equation and by a second equation considered appropriate 
based on the proportion of yield variation accounted for, the autocorrelation in residuals, 
and the signs and significance of the coefficients.  
The most notable general observation is that, like U.S. yields, world yield rates of 
increase have markedly slowed over time. Annual absolute increments for U.S. corn yield 
were much larger than for world cereal but the percentage gains are very similar because 
U.S.  yields were higher. Based on the linear equation, the U.S. corn yield increment 
predicted to be 1.01 percent per year in 2025 is near the world cereal gain predicted to be 
1.04 percent for the same year. In 2050, the U.S. corn yield increment predicted to be 
0.81 percent matches closely the 0.83 percent increment predicted for the world. The 
world weighted averages of the linear yield gains over all commodities, 0.87 percent in 
2025 and 0.70 percent in 2050, compare closely with the weighted average U.S. crop 
yield gains of 0.88 percent in 2025 and 0.72 percent in 2050.  
As stated earlier, demand for farm output based on the medium population variant 
of the United Nations is projected to be increasing at a rate of 1.17 percent per year in 
2025 and 0.71 percent  per  year in  2050.  It  is  notable that all but  one (vegetable oil 
quadratic) of the annual yield increments for individual commodity groups or for the 
weighted aggregate in table 3 fell short of that 1.17 percent demand growth in 2025. And    19 
the weighted average of the linear yield equation predictions, 0.70 percent in 2050, fell 
just short of the predicted 0.71 percent demand growth. 
 


































Source: See annex.  
aLinear equation for pig and cattle meat, quadratic equation for chicken meat. 
bQuadratic equation for eggs per hen; cow numbers and time variables in milk per cow equation. 
cPredicted rate negative, but assumed to be zero for weighted total of lowest rates.
 
dSee weights in table 4. 
 
The most impressive yield gains historically and in prospect are for cereals and 
oilseeds. Cereal  yield improvements are especially notable for hybrid corn and green 
revolution wheat and rice. Roundup-ready soybeans and canola rape constitute notable 
achievements in oilseeds. 
Each of the projected linear yield growth rates for the major crop groups in table 3 
falls short of 1.17 percent medium demand growth rate predicted for 2025. The average 
of the individual crop group yield growth rates weighted by share of world diets and 
projected to 2025 ranges from 0.74 for the lowest projected rates to 0.92 for the highest 
Crop or 
animal group 







1961  1975  2000  2025  2050 
Cereals  5.1  Linear  3.15  2.19  1.41  1.04  0.83 
  5.2  Quadratic  3.58 
 
2.27  1.56  0.87  0.62 
Meat and animal fats  11.1,12.1,13.1  Linear  0.59  0.55  0.48  0.43  0.39 
  11.1,12.1,13.2  ―Best‖
a  0.46 
 
0.51  0.54  0.54  0.52 
Vegetable oils  6.1  Linear  4.10  2.60  1.58  1.13  0.88 
  6.2  Quadratic  1.20 
 
2.02  2.25  1.97  1.66 
Sugars  7.1  Linear  1.46  1.21  0.93  0.76  0.64 
  7.2  Quadratic  0.95 
 
1.07  1.11  1.10  1.03 
Milk, eggs, fish  14.1, 15.1  Linear  0.58  0.51  0.42  0.36  0.32 
  14.2, 15.2  ―Best‖
b  1.50 
 
1.24  1.10  0.80  0.58 
Fruits (melons) 
and vegetables 
8.1  Linear  1.84  1.46  1.07  0.84  0.70 
8.2  Quadratic  2.19 
 
1.55  0.95  0.63  0.41 
Roots and tubers  9.1  Linear  0.76  0.69  0.58  0.51  0.45 
  9.2  Quadratic  1.25 
 
0.52  0.35  Neg.
c  Neg.
c 
Pulses  10.1  Linear  0.90  0.80  0.66  0.57  0.50 
  10.2  Quadratic  0.91  0.80  0.66  0.55  0.48 
               
Weighted total
d    Highest  2.71  1.80  1.35  0.92  0.83 
    Linear  2.38  1.69  1.13  0.87  0.70 
    Lowest  2.03  1.61  1.11  0.74  0.54   20 
projected growth rates. These rates are broadly in line with the low demand scenario 
projection, 0.83 percent in table 1, for 2025. If, optimistically, additional crop area in 
2025 adds 0.20 percent to farm output growth to bring the total output growth to 1.07 
percent under the linear projection in table 2, farm food ingredient growth will fall just 
short of medium demand growth and real food prices will not need to markedly increase. 
If the demand for farm output would have maintained the 1961 population growth rate of 
1.89 percent annually to 2025, only the projected vegetable oil yield could have kept 
pace. But the weighted total yield increase over all food groups would have fallen well 
short of the rise in demand and the result would have been sharply rising real food prices, 
food shortages, and new land broken out for crop production to the detriment of the 
environment. 
  By  2050  global  population  growth  will  slow  to  reduce  farm  output  demand 
growth from an estimated 0.18 percent (low growth) to 0.71 percent (medium growth) 
annually. Several predicted yield growth rates of crop groups in table 3 exceed those 
rates. Of interest is that the average of the linear estimates weighted by proportion of the 
world’s diet predicts yields increasing by 0.70 percent in 2050. This balance implies that 
farm output demand can be met without an increase in cropland area or by higher food 
prices. 
  Table 4 shows  global supply quantities  in  selected  years from  yield increases 
predicted by regression equations used to derive rates of increase in table 3 and shown in 
the  annex.  Based  on  superior  theoretical  and  statistical  properties  of  the  estimates,  a 
linear equation with time independent variable and a quadratic equation with time and 
time-square dependent were chosen to depict global supply quantities in table 4. The 
quadratic equations predicted modestly higher farm output from higher yields. Quadratic 
equations depicting accelerating yields are unrealistic as the time period is extended into 
the  future.  Whereas  both  linear  and  quadratic  projections  are  of  interest,  the  linear 
estimates are believed to best stand scrutiny. 
Assuming no increase in area and linear projections, yield gains are predicted to 
raise vegetable oil (oilseed) output by 39 percent and meat output by only 13 percent 
above  the  2000  level  by  2025.  By  year  2050  and  again  based  on  linear  estimates, 
vegetable oil output is projected to be up 79 percent and milk and egg output up 21 
percent from the 2000 level. Yield gains in livestock and livestock products will fall short 
of demand, and livestock and poultry numbers will need to expand.  
Based  on  the  medium  UN  population  projection,  the  global  demand  for  farm 
output is projected to be 43 percent over the 2000 demand in 2025 but supply from 
increasing yields alone will increase by only 28 percent (linear model). If each percentage 
point of excess demand, 15 percent, raises commodity prices by 2 percent, then the real 
price of farm output will be 30 percent over the 2000 level.  
By year 2050, demand is predicted to be 79 percent above the 2000 level whereas 
yields are projected to be up only 57 percent (linear model). If each of the 22 percentage 
points of excess demand raises commodity prices by 2 percent, then the real price of farm 
output would be up 44 percent by 2050 over the 2000 level. In a developed country such 
as the United States, farm ingredients may constitute only one-fifth of food cost and thus 
food cost will be up 9 percent. 
Other assumptions give different outcomes. Of note is that farm product demand 
and supply advances from yields alone are expected to approximately balance by 2050   21 
based  on  results  from  the  quadratic  yield  functions.  Such  an  outcome  implies  that 
additional crop area and higher real food prices may not be necessary but even no rise in 
real food prices stands in sharp contrast to the secular fall in food prices since 1960.  
  
Table 4. Global food supply by food group and total predicted, percent of year 2000 
 




The  foregoing  analysis  points  to  stable  to  rising  real  cost  of  food  in  future 
decades. This trend is a major departure from the historic trend of falling real food prices. 
Other observers see a similar pattern. The International Food Policy Research Institute 
(von Braun 2007, p. 8) projected that international food prices will rise by 26 percent for 
maize  and  18  percent  for  oilseeds  by  2020  over  prices  in  2005/2006.  With  greater 
expansion in biofuel production, the Institute projected price increases respectively of 72 
percent and 44 percent over the period. 
Of agricultural resources, land and associated climate, water, and location are the 
most fixed in supply. Opportunities exist to add to cropland in Brazil and Russia, add 
irrigation in Africa, and more efficiently use irrigation water, for example, but in the long 
term considered in this study such developments will be offset by cropland removed from 
production by urban and industrial development, soil degradation, and the like. These 
estimates of food supply-demand balance are based on constant real prices at the 2001 to 
2003 level. Cropland can be expanded through higher real farm and food prices, but 
higher yields rather than added cropland offer the most attractive opportunities for farm 
output expansion at low cost to consumers and the environment.   
Global farm output may need to nearly double in the first half of the 21
st century 
to fill demand without increasing real prices. The prospect of stable or rising real food 
prices at the farm level is neither the basis for panic nor complacency. Complacency 
currently is evident. Alston and Pardey (2008) show that the slowing rate of increase in 
yields and multi-factor productivity in American agriculture corresponds with a slowing 
Food  Share                                                                          Year         
group  of diet                   
  2001-03  1961   1975   2000  2025   2050  
        Linear  Quadratic      Linear  Quadratic        Linear  Quadratic    Linear  Quadratic 
Cereals  0.496  45  52  65  78  100  135  155  171  187 
Meat  0.108  80  82  87  88  100  113  115  126  126 
Veg. oils  0.102  38  45  61  57  100  139  170  179  267 
Sugar crops  0.092  64  66  77  76  100  123  132  147  173 
Milk, eggs  0.069  84  81  90  94  100  110  123  121  148 
Fruits,  veg.  0.057  58  57  73  74  100  127  121  154  138 
Roots, tuber  0.055  77  75  85  87  100  115  104  129   99 






56  60  72  78  100  128  143  157  176   22 
rate of increase in public and in private agricultural research and development spending 
from  1953  to  2004.  The  world  will  not  have  the  luxury  of  turning  down  promising 
technologies such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs) if is to keep real food costs 
from rising.  
The situation is dire in many developing regions of the world but most notably in 
Africa. Consumers in poor regions such as Africa spend a high proportion of their income 
on food, so a food price spike as in 2007-2008 constitutes a major hardship (see annex 
table 4). Still, a meager 0.5 percent of Africa’s agricultural gross domestic product is 
spent  on  research  to  improve  the  productivity  of  farming,  a  small  fraction  of  what 
developed countries spend to improve their agriculture. 
This analysis indicates that part of the farm commodity price rise in 2007-2008 
was the product of a tighter food supply-demand balance arising from long-term systemic 
factors  that  will  not  go  away.  Productive  new  cropland,  irrigation,  and  genetically 
modified varieties will be hard pressed indeed to match the massive historic gains from 
hybrid  varieties,  irrigation,  synthetic  fertilizers,  and  mechanization.  World  agriculture 
will likely operate on a new plateau of generally high real prices in the future, but the 
basic market structure will remain unchanged.  Buyers will bid up land prices until real 
returns average near historic levels—near 4 percent on investment. Variations in prices 
around  the  new  plateau  will  continue  unabated  and  will  emanate  from  some  new 
sources—such as fluctuating oil prices. Nominal returns will exceed real returns by the 
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Annex 
  This annex shows the statistical model and empirical estimates used to quantify 
supply  shifts  reported  in  the  text.  Global  annual  yield  data  are  from  1961  (the  first 
available year) to 2007 (latest available year) and are from FAO (2008). U.S. price and 
selected other data are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA 2008). Statistical 
results are presented first for four major U.S. crops followed by results for world crop 
groups  and  livestock  groups.  The  world  estimates  form  the  basis  for  the  supply 
projections in the text. 
 
Statistical model 
The initial model for estimating yield in this study is: 
(a) Y t = a +bP t+cAt +dT + et 
(b) Yt – Yt-1 = g (Y t - Yt-1) 
(c) Yt = ag +bgP t+cgAt +dgT + (1-g)Yt-1 + get. 
In annex equation (a), actual yield Y t of a crop in year t is assumed to be a function of 
expected price P t, area in the crop At, a technology variable T, and an error term et, the 
latter assumed to be normally and independently distributed with a constant variance. A 
structural  supply  model  ideally  would  include  separate  exogenous  variables  for 
education,  management,  research,  information  systems,  and  infrastructure  shifting  the 
supply curve over time. Those variables are not available for the commodities included in 
the supply analysis. Because the collective trajectory of these variables changes only 
gradually over time, they are represented by the proxy variable T in the statistical model.
3 
  Long-term true coefficients of the three independent variables P, A, and T are 
respectively b, c, and d. Short -term coefficients are ag, bg, and cg in equation (c). 
Variable A is included to reflect the depressing impact on Y of expanding production on 
the extensive margin to inferior land. Adjustment to the equilibrium or desired yield Y t is 
not instantaneous: actual adjustment as depicted by the left side of equation (b) is some 
proportion g of the desired adjustment expressed by the term in the right side parenthesis. 
Substituting  annex  equation  (a)  into  equation  (b)  gives  equation  (c).  Equation  (c)  is 
empirically estimated assuming the commodity price expectation variable P t= 0.50 P t-1 
+ 0.33 P t-2 + 0.17 P t-3. All prices are adjusted to ―real‖ terms by the GDP deflator. 
  The above model is assumed to be recursive, with supply price and yield not 
simultaneously determined with demand. Rather, supply quantity is predetermined by 
past price and other variables.  
  The secular decline in real commodity prices is closely correlated with and indeed 
is caused by the rising productivity of resources used to produce crops. Nonstationarity 
and  multicollinearity  were  evident  in  the  variables  for  the  U.S.  in  equation  (c).  The 
problem of autocorrelated residuals likely to characterize equation (c) was addressed with 
a  first  order  autoregressive  scheme.  The  first  order  autogression  coefficient  was 
significantly different from zero only for U.S. cotton in the equation (c) model. In that 
equation, the coefficient of time T was highly significant but the coefficients of the area 
and expected price variables were not statistically significant. In another approach to deal 
                                                 
3 Technology T is represented by the time variable, the year less 1900. That formulation (1961=61, 
1962=62, etc.) is used throughout because statistical results are not invariant to the coding. In a double log 
equation, a time variable with 1.0 as the origin allows more curvature than with 1961 as the origin. The 
number 61 as the origin is an arbitrary compromise.    26 
with nonstationarity, equation (c) without variable T was estimated in first differences 
and the constant term was the coefficient of T. In each of these attempts, the coefficient 
of  A  was  positive  or  insignificant  and  the  coefficient  of  price  was  negative  or 
insignificant.  
  Empirical results indicate that the time trend (expressing a regular pattern of the 
influence on yields from changing technology and the like over time) has dominated 
yields. That domination has fully overshadowed the impact of prices and area on yields. 
Thus  empirical  estimation  of  structural  equation  (c)  met  with  limited  success.  The 
insignificant  and/or  of  the  wrong  (negative)  sign  on  the  price  coefficient  incorrectly 
implied that higher prices  exert no or negative influence on  yields.  The insignificant 
and/or wrong (positive) sign on the area incorrectly implied that extending area in a crop 
exerts  no  or  positive  influence  on  yields.  Refinements  including  expectation  and 
adjustment models, first differences, and autoregressive least squares did not improve 
results for U.S. commodity supply and therefore were not attempted for the global supply 
equations. 
  Of particular interest was the trajectory of global supply shifts over time measured 
by various forms of variable T. Unfortunately, model refinements such as first differences 
were  not  well  suited  to  modeling  the  yield  trend  with  alternative  mathematical 
specifications of T: as a quadratic function (T and T-square) or segmented to allow a 
different  time  trend  by  decade.  Other  specifications  included  a  semi-logarithm  (the 
dependent variable only in logs) function, double logarithm function, and a logarithm-
inverse  (dependent  variable  in  logs,  time  as  inverse  1/T).  These  specifications  and  a 
linear specification permitted commodity yield to change at a constant, increasing, or 
decreasing rate over time. For the most part, the linear or quadratic equations with yield a 
function  of  time-only  proved  superior  to  other  specifications.  Quadratic  equations 
accounted  for  a  high  proportion  of  variance  in  yields  from  1961  to  2007  in  several 
instances  but  such  equations  (predicting  that  yields  in  the  future  would  decline  or 
increase at an increasing rate) were judged to be less satisfactory than linear equations 
when projecting to year 2050.  
In short, the various specifications of (c) containing area, price, first differences, 
autoregressive  schemes,  and  expectation  and  adjustment  models  did  not  improve 
predictions of commodity yield. Given the need for a predictive rather than a structural 
model for this  analysis and given that structural  refinements  tended to interfere with 
alternative  specifications  of  the  trend  variable,  this  analysis  relies  on  ordinary  least 
squares  with  various  specifications  of  a  trend  variable  to  predict  the  movement  of 
commodity  supply  over  time.  This  simplified  analysis  resulted  in  higher  projected 
estimates  of  supply  quantity  for  2025  and  2050  than  did  the  more  complex  but 
unacceptable specifications of supply. 
Empirical results  
  The supply-demand balance for food is achieved in a global market, hence it is 
not possible to analyze the food balance for the United States in isolation. But it is of 
interest  to  observe  how  yield  trends  in  the  U.S.  compare  with  global  yield  trends. 
Statistical equations for yields of major crops in the U.S. using annual data for the 1961 
to 2007 period and the modified statistical model of equation (c) are shown in annex table 
1. 
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  Intercept  Time T
a  Time 
square 
Corn yield (hg/ha)
b           
   1.1 Linear  -30,223  1,153.848 
(66.025) 
  0.869  2.502 
    [17.48]       
   1.2 Log-log  4.558  1.475 
(0.0855) 
  0.866  2.436 
    [17.25]       
Soybean yield (hg/ha)           
   2.1 Linear  -192.804  255.877 
(18.638) 
  0.803  2.089 
    [13.73]       
   2.2 Log yield   8.942  0.0120 
(0.000842) 
  0.815  2.149 
    [14.26]       
Wheat yield (hg/ha)           
   3.1 Linear  2,759.504  243.024 
(18.234) 
  0.793  1.287 
    [13.33]       




0.816  1.466 
    [3.55]  [-2.54]     
Cotton yield (hg/ha)           
   4.1 Linear  507.897  198.261 
(22.048) 
  0.635  1.343 
    [8.99]       




0.698  1.647 
    [-2.52]  [3.24]     
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2008 
aTime variable is current year minus 1900, i.e. 1961=61, 1962=62, etc. Standard errors are in parenthesis; t 
values are in brackets. 
bHg/ha is hectograms per hectare. 
 
Statistical equation 1.1 indicates that a linear time variable accounts for a large 
share of the variation in U.S. corn yield over time, a result similar to that in annex table 2 
for global yield. The highly significant coefficient of time (t-value 17.48) in equation 1.1 
indicates that cereal yield in the nation increased on average by 1,154 hectograms per 
hectare  per  year—nearly  two  bushels  per  acre  (corn  equivalent)  over  the  1961-2007 
period. Equation 1.2 estimated with yield and time in natural logarithms allowed yield to 
increase  at  a  decreasing  rate  over  time,  but  its  statistical  properties  indicated  no 
improvement over the linear model. Other specifications discussed earlier in the annex 
also did not improve on equation 1.1. 
  Linear equation 2.1 estimating U.S. soybean yield per hectare accounts for 80 
percent of the variation in yield over the 1961-2007 period. The estimated annual yield 
gain  of  256  hectograms  per  hectare  is  23  pounds  per  acre  per  year.    The  semi-log   28 
equation  2.2  (with  the  dependent  variable  in  natural  logarithms  and  time  in  original 
values)  allows  yields  to  increase  at  a  constant  percentage  rate  and  was  a  modest 
improvement over linear equation 2.1. (See the text for a plot of yields and comparison 
among percentage rates of growth predicted by the various annex table equations.) 
  Linear  equation  3.1  estimates  that  wheat  yields  increased  at  near  the  rate  of 
soybean  yields  over  time.  The  quadratic  equation  3.2  improves  somewhat  over  the 
statistical properties of linear equation 3.1. The quadratic equation provides evidence that 
annual wheat yield increments have been diminishing over time. 
Cotton is not a food crop, but lagging cotton yields could require more area to be 
planted  to  cotton  rather  than  food  crops.  The  quadratic  equation  4.2  displays  some 
statistical  improvement  over linear equation 4.1 in  accounting  for variation in  cotton 
yields. The negative coefficient on the time variable and positive coefficient on time-
square allows for yields that increased at an increasing rate in recent years. Because the 
acceleration in recent yields appears to be due to weather and other transitory elements, 
the linear equation 4.1 may be a more reliable predictor of future U.S. cotton yields than 
quadratic equation 4.2.  
Other  specifications  including  prices,  expectation  and  adjustment  models,  and 
alternative functional forms did not improve on results in annex table 1. 
We now turn to global yields to measure supply shifts for crops. Annex table 2 
shows linear and quadratic equations, judged to be the preferred specifications based on 
statistical properties, for estimating yields of the six major world crop groups with annual 
data from 1961 to 2007. 
The yield trend for cereals (corn, barley, grain sorghum, rice, wheat, etc.) is of 
special importance because the crop group accounts for from half to two-thirds of world 
food consumption, the latter proportion accounting for grains fed to livestock. Linear 
equation 5.1 accounts for 99 percent of the variation in global cereal yield from 1961 to 
2007, based on the adjusted R-square. The highly significant statistical coefficient of time 
T  in  equation  5.1  indicates  that  on  average  the  yield  of  cereals  advanced  by  43.6 
kilograms/hectare per year. (The graphs of predicted linear trend yields from equations in 
annex table 2 and actual yields are shown in the text.)   Quadratic global cereal yield 
equation 5.2 features statistically significant coefficients of the linear and squared time 
variables  along  with  a  slightly  improved  adjusted  R-square  and  Durbin-Watson  test. 
Especially of note is the negative coefficient of T-square in equation 5.2, predicting that 
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Annex table 2. Statistical equations of global crop yields using annual data, 1961 to 2007 
Dependent variable 












     
Cereal yield (tons/ha)             
  5.1 Linear  -1.274  0.0436      0.990  1.776 
    (0.000642)         
    [67.89]         
  5.2 Quadratic  -1.983  0.0609  -0.000103    0.991  1.937 
    (0.00863)  (0.0000512)       
    [7.06]  [-2.01]       
Oil crops (tons/ha)             
  6.1 Linear  -0.285  0.00778      0.967  0.282 
    (0.000214)         
    [36.42]         
  6.2 Quadratic  0.470  -0.0107  0.000110    0.995  1.958 
    (0.00110)  (0.00000656)       
    [-9.68]  [16.77]       
Sugar crops (tons/ha)             
  7.1 Linear  4.022  0.544      0.966  0.760 
    (0.0150)         
    [36.38]         
  7.2 Quadratic  30.342  -0.0993  0.00383    0.973  0.947 
    (0.186)  (0.00111)       
    [-0.53]  [3.46]       
Melons and vegetables(tons/ha)           
  8.1 Linear  -1.159  0.178      0.993  1.193 
    (0.00210)         
    [83.48]         
  8.2 Quadratic  -5.446  0.280  -0.000624    0.995  1.655 
    (0.0248)  (0.000148)       
    [11.27]  [-4.23]       
Roots and tubers 
(tons/ha) 
           
  9.1 Linear  5.524  0.0780      0.872  1.065 
      (0.00441)         
    [17.69]         
  9.2 Quadratic  -1.327  0.245  -0.000997    0.891  1.280 
    (0.0565)  (0.000336)       
    [4.34]  [-2.97]       
Pulses (tons/ha)             
  10.1 Linear  0.278  0.00550      0.872  1.081 
    (0.000310)         
    [[17.72]         
  10.2 Quadratic  0.265  0.00583  -0.00000198    0.869  1.081 
    (0.00436)  (0.0000259)       
    [1.34]  [-0.08]       
Source: Data from FAOSTAT (2008) 
aTime variable is year less 1900, i.e. 1961=61, 1962=62, etc. Standard errors are in parenthesis; t ratios in 
brackets. All coefficients on T and T-square are statistically significant at the 1 percent level or better 
except for those in equation 10.2, and on T in equation 7.2. The coefficient on T-square was significant at 
the 5 percent level in equation in equation 5.2. 
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  The linear equation 6.1 for oil crops (soybeans, rapeseed, etc.) in annex table 2 
indicates that yields are increasing on average by 7.78 kilograms/hectare per year. The oil 
crop  yield  trend  is  better  depicted  by  the  quadratic  equation  6.2  than  by  the  linear 
equation 6.1 based on the former’s highly significant coefficients, higher adjusted R-
square,  and  less  evidence  of  autocorrelated  residuals  based  on  the  Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Of note is that oilcrops are the only ones displaying evidence that historic yields 
are increasing at an increasing rate. 
  Linear equation 7.1 indicates that sugar crop (beet and cane) yields increased on 
average by 0.544 metric tons/hectare annually from 1961 to 2007. The quadratic equation 
7.2 of global sugar crop yield as a function of a time variables T and T-square displays a 
slightly higher adjusted R-square than the linear equation but the coefficient of T in 7.2 is 
not statistically significant.  
  On average, fruits and vegetables comprise less than 6 percent of diets around the 
world and are represented by melon and vegetable yield equations in annex table 2. The 
time variable accounted for a high proportion of the variation in melon and vegetable 
yields from 1961 to 2007 as evident from linear equation 8.1. The highly significant 
coefficient of T predicted that yields increased on average 0.178 metric tons per year. The 
adjusted R-square and Durbin-Watson statistic were slightly improved by the quadratic 
equation 8.2 but, notably, the negative coefficient on the time-square variable suggests 
that incremental yield gains have declined over time. 
  The time variable accounts for relatively less of the variation in root and tuber 
yields (equation 9.1) and pulse (bean, food legume) yields (equation 10.1) than in yields 
of other crop groups in annex table 2. Roots and tubers (potatoes, cassava, yams, etc.) 
account for 5 percent of diets and pulses for 2 percent of diets around the world but are 
especially  of  importance  to  developing  countries.  It  is  of  concern  that  yields  are 
increasing slowly, 0.078 metric tons per year for roots and tubers and only 0.0055 metric 
tons per year for pulses based on linear equation 9.1 and 10.1 respectively. Furthermore, 
annual yield increments of the two crop groups are getting smaller as evidenced by the 
negative coefficients of the time-square variable in quadratic equations 9.2 and 10.2. 
  The concept of area and yield in crop production has counterparts in animals and 
yield per animal in livestock production. But similarities go only so far. Crop output 
depends heavily on yield of crops because global expansion at the extensive margin of 
land area is severely constrained by natural resource and environmental limits.   
Most food comes directly from crops or from livestock that are fed crops. As such 
livestock are less of a constraint than crops in providing food in the future. With time for 
biological processes to work, livestock can be expanded almost without limit if crop feed 
is  available.  Still,  ability  to  produce  more  food  per  animal  and  hence  improved 
technology and management have played a key role in reducing the real cost of dairy and 
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Annex table 3. Statistical equations of global livestock yields using annual data, 1961 to 
2007 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2008 
aTime variable is year less 1900, i.e. 1961=61, 1962=62, etc. Animal numbers in 10.2 are in million hens 
and in 11.2 are in number of cows. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors and in brackets are t-ratios 
of the coefficient to the standard error. 
 
Livestock  yield  per  animal  is  one  measure,  albeit  imperfect,  of  livestock 
productivity. The livestock yield model is that of annex equation (c) except that yield is 
output per animal and ―area‖ is number of animals. Statistical results of the simplified 
model, presented in annex table 3, are on the whole less satisfactory than crop results in 
annex table 2 because livestock data are less reliable. As shown in graphs in the text, 
Dependent 
variable 
















Pig meat (hg/pig)           
  11.1 Linear  390.500  3.879      0.943  0.529 
    (0.1405)         
    [27.60]         
  11.2 Quadratic  353.753  4.777  -0.00535    0.942  0.535 
    (1.970)  0.0117       
    [2.43]  [-0.46]       
Cattle meat (tons/head)           
  12.1 Linear  1.161  0.00778      0.758  0.097 
    (0.00911)         
    [12.04]         
  12.2 Quadratic  -1.450  0.0729  -0.000380    0.956  0.488 
    (0.00447)  (0.0000266)       
    [16.30]  [-14.30]       
Chicken meat yield 
(hg/chicken) 
         
  13.1 Linear  6,879  71.195      0.973  0.771 
    (1.735)         
    [41.04]         
  13.2 Quadratic  12,134  -57.284  0.765    0.990  2.066 
    (14.730)  (0.0874)       
    [-3.89]  [8.74]       
Egg yield (kg/hen)           
  14.1 Linear  2.503  0.0790      0.948  0.252 
    (0.00273)         
    [28.98]         
  14.2 Lin.+  0.6320  0.1236    -.000539
a  0.966  0.307 
    (0.00909)    (0.00011)     
    [13.60]    [-5.06]     
Milk yield (hg/cow)           
  15.1 Linear  8,925  7.843      0.065  0.232 
      (3.836)         
    [2.04]         
  15.2 Lin.+   8,289  148.931    -.0000220
a  0.640  0.441 
    (16.700)    (0.00000258)     
    [8.92]    [-8.54]       32 
livestock  data  in  several  cases  show  erratic  movements  and  periodic  trends  that  are 
difficult to explain except as shortcomings of the data. 
Output per pig has been rising on average by nearly four hectograms (hg) or 0.4 
kilograms annually based on annex equation 11.1. Quadratic equation 11.2 with yield a 
function of time and time-square offered little advantage over linear equation 11.1. The 
negative coefficient implies diminishing yield improvement over the 1961-2007 study 
period, but the statistically insignificant time-square coefficient indicates the trend was 
essentially linear. 
  Statistical parameters of quadratic equation 12.2 for cattle yield are superior to 
those of linear equation 12.1.  Beef output per animal  increased on average  about  8 
kilograms per year from 1961 to 2007, but the increments have been getting smaller over 
time  according  to  equation  12.2.  Yield  gains  per  chicken  also  are  slowing  based  on 
statistical results in equation 13.2.  
  Statistical  results  of  equations  depicting  egg  and  dairy  yield  are  improved  by 
including number of animals as independent variables. Improvements in technology and 
management  that  have  increased  egg  yield  per  hen  (equation  14)  and  milk  per  cow 
(equation 15) also have restrained chicken and cow numbers—given the limited demand 
for eggs and dairy products.  
  The annual percentage rates of growth and total supply of farm output derived 
from equations in annex tables 2 and 3 are shown in the text for selected within-sample 
and projected future years. 
 


















Per capita food increase 
from income 
             
    Total  Increase       
  (Million)  ($)  (% incr/yr)      (%/yr.) 
    1994      Unweighted  Weighted 
 
Low income  3,185  380  3.0  0.048  0.6  1.80  0.0869 
               
Middle income  1,570  2,520  1.8  0.158  0.3  0.54  0.0853 
               
High income  850  23,420  1.2  0.794  0.1  0.10  0.0953 
        1.000      0.2675 
 
    2050         
 
Low income  6,206  1,989  2.1  0.189  0.5  1.05  0.1985 
               
Middle income  2,075  6,843  1.3  0.217  0.2  0.26  0.0564 
               
High income  850  45,677  0.8  0.594  0.05  0.040  0.0238 
        1.000      0.2787 
Source: Tweeten (2007, annex table 9.1); see Mellor (1996) for income elasticities. 
   